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Within histories of British fascism and anti-fascism, opposition to the New 
Party has attracted scant attention. The preamble to more serious episodes of 
conflict between Mosley’s Blackshirts and their anti-fascist opponents, it 
typically invites only the most cursory of accounts. However, as this article 
demonstrates, labour movement opposition to the New Party should not be 
dealt with simply as a form of embryonic anti-fascism. The author argues that 
it was a dual-faceted phenomenon, and whilst it did share obvious similarities 
with later campaigns against the British Union of Fascists, it was also 
dissimilar in other respects.  
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From the very beginnings, and through its short existence, the New Party encountered 
organised disruption from labour movement opponents. Before the ink had even dried 
on the statement announcing the formation of the New Party, the Daily Worker had 
already labelled Mosley „our “English Hitler”‟.2 At the inaugural meeting of the New 
Party in London‟s Memorial Hall on 5 March 1931, Cynthia Mosley had to suffer 
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interruption from various parts of the hall. One persistent heckler was almost thrown 
over the balustrade by a burly steward, giving rise to shouts from the audience of 
„How do you like your Fascism now?‟3 In the weeks that followed, as it unveiled 
itself to the British public, disruption occurred at a succession of New Party 
meetings.
4
 One meeting in Liverpool was said to have closed in „absolute uproar‟ 
when Communist leaflets, exposing the „fascist‟ nature of the New Party, rained down 
on the audience from the gallery.
5
 Scenes of pandemonium occurred the following 
month at the Ashton-under-Lyne by-election where Labour Party opponents harassed 
the „Judas Mosley‟ at the declaration. Then, in September 1931, at one of the largest 
open-air meetings ever held in Glasgow, Mosley was chased and stoned by 
opponents.
6
 During the New Party‟s ill-fated October 1931 general election campaign, 
its meeting at Birmingham‟s Rag Market ended in riotous disorder. Even after April 
1932, when the New Party had ceased to exist as a political party, and when all that 
remained was a series of New Party youth movement (NUPA) clubs, Mosley‟s 
followers still attracted labour movement antipathy. Disorder occurred at outdoor 
meetings in Greenwich and Deptford where a NUPA club (no. 2) was active.
7
 In July 
1932 a fight between Mosley‟s followers and opponents in Hyde Park was reported in 
the columns of over twenty newspapers.
8
 Just weeks before the British Union of 
Fascists (BUF) was formed, Croydon Town Hall was the scene of clashes between 
Mosley militants - some of whom had already donned blackshirts - and left-wing 
opponents.
9
  
This article, then, appraises both the nature and extent of this labour 
movement opposition, a subject that has been generally overlooked by historians in 
both the voluminous literature on British fascism, and within the newly emerging 
field of anti-fascism.
10
 Was it true that „All over the country‟, the New Party „met a 
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storm of organised violence‟, as Mosley‟s autobiographical account claims?11 What 
relationship, if any, did labour movement opposition have with later campaigns 
against the British Union of Fascists? Did opposition to the New Party represent an 
incipient anti-fascism? Or was it more a case of the labour movement defending itself 
against a perfidious attack of „Mosleyitis‟? Appropriately (and apparently) coined by 
Arthur Greenwood, the Labour Minister of Health, „Mosleyitis‟ constituted a disease 
of „short duration‟. „It is like measles‟, Greenwood had remarked during a speech to 
Labour supporters in Cynthia Mosley‟s Stoke constituency in April 1931, but „We 
shall soon get over it, and after the next election‟ the New Party „will be as dead as 
the parties or groups which in the past have founded themselves on ambition and 
impatience‟.12  
 
Responding to Mosley and the New Party 
 
Mosley‟s decision to form his breakaway New Party in early 1931 sickened Labour‟s 
leadership. The root cause of such indignation lay deep within the Labour Party‟s 
organisational consciousness. Traditionally, as Skidelsky explains, the Labour Party 
had seen itself as, 
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a party of rebellion - a movement of the weak against the strong. But the one 
hope of the weak lies in their numbers; and numbers are useless without 
discipline. That is why when the crunch comes the Party tends to close its 
ranks and follow its leaders, why appeals to „solidarity‟ nearly always 
succeed.
13
 
 
Party unity was always jealously guarded and Mosley had broken it. To make matters 
worse, this break had occurred at a time when sensitivity to this issue was especially 
acute. This was no surprise given the precarious position that MacDonald‟s Labour 
government now found itself in. Within a minority government, struggling to come to 
terms with a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, parliamentary indiscipline, 
„invariably impeded by the relentless hostility of the House of Lords‟, and „subject to 
continuous attack through a network of daily, evening and weekly newspapers‟,14 
there was obvious concern that further dissent within Labour‟s ranks might cause the 
party to fracture. 
Notwithstanding a „few footloose orphans from other parties‟,15 the Mosley 
rebel MPs had comprised a small group of left-wing Labour Party dissidents. A 
member of the National Administrative Council of the Independent Labour Party 
(ILP) from 1927 to 1929, Mosley was identified with (and he identified himself with) 
the Labour „Left‟. Moreover, of those that had tendered their resignations from the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) in support of Mosley, that is to say, John Strachey 
(24 February), Dr Robert Forgan (24 February), Oliver Baldwin (26 February), 
Cynthia Mosley (3 March), and William J. Brown (4 March), Cynthia Mosley, 
Strachey, Forgan and Brown were all members of the ILP. Brown, moreover, was 
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secretary of the ILP‟s Parliamentary Group and it was Brown who had looked to bring 
together the ILP parliamentary contingent with those MPs gathered around Mosley.
16
 
For a moment, with the ILP on the brink of disaffiliation from the Labour Party,
17
 it 
was feared that that the ILP might secede and join Mosley, along with some trade 
unionists such as the miners‟ leader Arthur Cook and Anuerin Bevan, who had both 
expressed support for Mosley in late 1930.
18
 What's more, beyond Labour‟s left-wing 
critics, there were also concerns that the New Party might become a „home-from-
home‟ for more moderate elements disheartened by the failings of the MacDonald 
government. Labour leaders were only too aware that Mosley, widely touted as a 
future party leader, was hugely popular with the rank-and-file. Only a few months 
before, he had been elected to the Labour Party‟s National Executive Committee 
(NEC) for a third time with some 1.36 million votes.
19
   
Although Mosley had been well-liked by MacDonald, with whom he had once 
shared a friendship - journeying together to Prague, Berlin and Vienna in 1928
20
 - it 
was outside the corridors of Westminster where Mosley commanded most admiration. 
Whilst the majority of the PLP retained their suspicions,
21
 expressions of support 
were far more effusive when Mosley took to the public platform. With speeches filled 
with fiery rhetoric, as Frank Ridley recalled, Mosley „was cheered to the echo up and 
down the country‟.22 Amongst the Labour Party‟s grassroots the image that Mosley 
cultivated was that of a dynamic, passionate and confident young man, selflessly 
forgoing the interest of his own class in order to defend the working class, especially 
the massed ranks of the unemployed. As a champion of unemployed workers, 
Mosley‟s aristocratic background had given him a certain cachet. But once outside the 
party, Mosley‟s social origins exposed him all too quickly to Labour‟s class-based 
scorn. He might not have been the only well-heeled recruit to Labour,
23
 but by first 
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sowing dissension within the PLP and then breaking away, Mosley had, for Labour‟s 
leaders, revealed his true pedigree as an overweening, thoroughbred aristocrat. Here 
was someone who, because of his personal wealth and social position, was so used to 
giving orders that he acted like a „free-lance‟ and „self-elected leader‟, placing 
personal ambition above loyalty to the party.
24
 Moreover, by seeking to mobilise 400 
candidates at the next general election, and by arraigning the Labour front bench for 
its betrayal of socialism, Mosley‟s New Party had declared open hostilities on Labour. 
And whilst Labour leaders were prepared to tolerate some difference of opinion, they 
could not stand idly by and tolerate the formation of a new party, especially one intent 
on waging a war against it in Labour‟s own working-class heartlands. As the Daily 
Herald warned, „The Mosleyites... have not merely differed from the Party, they have 
declared war on it... And they will be treated accordingly‟.25  
What this meant in practice, more on later. But what of the part played by anti-
fascism? Did this figure anywhere in the retort of Labour‟s leaders? It was during one 
heated exchange in the Cabinet room, just prior to Mosley‟s resignation from his 
ministerial post that Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, had accused 
Mosley of treachery, declaring before the assembled Ministers that the public would 
have no time for a „pocket Mussolini‟.26 All the same, and in spite of the occasional 
prescient remark that the New Party would end up fascist – a comment tellingly made 
by Aneurin Bevan – Labour‟s leadership made little use of anti-fascism.27 One reason, 
no doubt, was that the party leadership had little to no theoretical understanding of 
fascism beyond simply equating it with „dictatorship‟. In their eyes, Mosley was an 
impatient, ostentatious, self-aggrandising man who, in wanting to form a five-man 
inner executive committee in Whitehall, was intent on destroying parliamentary 
democracy and replacing it with a „Mosley dictatorship‟. It followed that he was a 
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„fascist‟, but this was not a characterisation that Labour‟s leaders zealously brought to 
the fore. Surprisingly, the word „fascist‟ seemed in greater use during the October 
1931 general election campaign when pressed into service not against the New Party 
but against the MacDonald-Baldwin „National‟ coalition. A vote for the political 
oligarchy of the „Nationals‟ was for the Daily Herald, a vote „against democracy, a 
vote against freedom, a vote for the pinchbeck Fascism of a bunch of pinchbeck 
Mussolinis‟.28 
More than the Labour Party, it was the Communist Party (CP) that responded 
with appeals to anti-fascism. Since Mosley was associated with the ILP and the 
dissident Labour „Left‟, the CP‟s initial response was determined by its desire to 
break the credibility of „Left Labourism‟. Still in its „class against class‟ phase, and on 
constant vigil against „social fascism‟, the CP saw Mosley‟s New Labour group, and 
the publication of its manifesto in late 1930, as a sinister new stage in the social 
fascist development of both the ILP and the wider Labour Party. Mosley‟s Manifesto, 
which alongside Arthur Cook, also boasted a number of ILP signatories,
29
 had been 
dismissed by the CP as an attempt to trick the workers into accepting capitalism. The 
fact that Jimmy Maxton, and several other ILP leaders had distanced themselves from 
the manifesto, claiming that it „put socialism in the background‟, made little 
difference. „Left Labourism‟, the CP declared, was the „reserve weapon of the 
bourgeoisie‟, and the only difference between the social fascism of Mosley and that of 
Maxton was the method, not the principle.
30
  
With the formation of the New Party, however, the CP‟s analysis started to 
shift. As the Communist Party‟s Central Committee minutes record, by the middle of 
March 1931, since Mosley had abandoned the „phraseology of socialism‟, it was 
agreed that the New Party should no longer be classified as „social fascism‟, but rather 
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as „incipient fascism‟ or „fascism in embryo‟. The significance of the New Party 
having recently recruited W.E.D. Allen, the Belfast Unionist MP was not lost on 
Harry Pollitt either who described Allen as an „out and out Fascist‟.31 The CP must be 
ready to act, Pollitt declared. „We cannot laugh‟ at the New Party „and to 
underestimate it would be a mistake‟.32 For Pollitt, resistance to the New Party was 
now imperative. If left unchallenged Mosley might strike a respondent chord with two 
different strata of the working class, Pollitt thought: impressionable youth, seduced by 
attractive slogans promising a „a national plan for a national emergency‟, and those 
aged between 45 and 55 displaced by economic rationalisation, who had lost all hope 
of being re-absorbed into the workplace.
 33
  
Did the New Party amount to a „fully-fledged‟ or „actual‟ fascism? Not yet, 
Pollitt argued, because the New Party retained contacts with those within the Labour 
Party and ILP, who although unwilling to jump ship, had still not given up the fight 
for the programme that Mosley had originally put forward. Hence Pollitt suspected 
that Allan Young, secretary of Mosley‟s New Party would attend the ILP‟s annual 
conference at Scarborough in April 1931 „with the idea of influencing a considerable 
element who are dissatisfied with the I.L.P., and will try to canalise this discontent in 
the direction of Mosley‟.34 If truth be told, Pollitt‟s suspicions were not without 
foundation. Many of the New Party‟s earliest recruits had originated from the ILP,35 
and if in Scotland, those that joined the New Party had been quickly expelled from the 
ILP, dual membership had been tolerated elsewhere. Nonetheless, Mosley had limited 
residues of ILP support. „The “Left” on the whole regarded Mosley‟s projects as 
“reformism”‟, W.J. Brown later wrote, and even though he had resigned from the 
PLP, Brown baulked at joining the New Party following the publication of an 
interview with Mosley in the Observer which had given the New Party a „quasi-
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Fascist complexion‟.36 At the ILP‟s Scarborough conference, when Maxton ruled that 
membership of Mosley‟s New Party was inconsistent with membership of the ILP, 
there were few dissenting voices. One delegate (from Birmingham) did declare that 
this announcement had „come like a bombshell to the representatives of his area‟, and 
it was his belief that there was still sufficient socialism in New Party policy to allow 
for some leniency with the rank-and-file (if not for party officers and public 
representatives). Another Midlands delegate was quick to deny, however, that „any 
considerable number of members would be involved in the Midlands‟. In any case, 
Maxton held firm - there was no socialism in the New Party, he maintained.
37
  
Maxton chose not to raise the spectre of fascism in his conference 
announcement. From the start, rather than anti-fascism, the ILP‟s reading of the New 
Party had been determined by Mosley‟s call for „class collaboration‟. Since political 
parties had to represent economic interests – „otherwise they were meaningless and 
cannot endure‟ – the ILP had dismissed the New Party‟s call for class collaboration as 
a mirage. For the ILP, „Permanent political formations are not called into being by the 
waving of a magician‟s wand. They cannot be created merely to reflect a striking 
personality. Nor can they continue indefinitely merely because they command great 
financial resources‟. Accordingly, the New Party „is building on shifting sands‟.38 The 
tone of such a response, more dismissive than alarmist, was certainly mild in 
comparison to that of the CP. Needless to say, it provided further weight to the CP‟s 
argument that the only practical influence that the ILP had served in recent years was 
to „provide the jumping-off board for the Mosley group and its programme of a fascist 
type‟.39 
So, if the New Party represented an incipient fascism, what was the nature of 
the CP‟s opposition to it? Was it, likewise, an embryonic anti-fascism? It is surely 
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tempting to see it as such. As the well-documented CP-led mobilisations against 
Mosley‟s BUF at Olympia and Hyde Park in 1934 show, when Mosleyism developed 
into fully-fledged fascism, the CP graduated its response accordingly. But for two 
reasons, such a linear interpretation is too neat. To begin with, increasing the cause 
(fully-fledged fascism) did not necessarily increase the effect (mobilisation of anti-
fascist opposition). There was a downward trend in the level of CP opposition during 
the first five or six months of the BUF‟s existence. Not until after Hitler‟s seizure of 
power in March 1933 did anti-fascism really gather pace. Even then, for some time, 
the BUF could still claim that opposition in the old New Party days had been more 
obvious. Drawing on figures provided by the Home Secretary, the BUF crowed that 
disturbances had taken place at less than 2 per cent of Blackshirt meetings during the 
last six months of 1933.
40
 Secondly, if the CP‟s anti-fascism was „embryonic‟ in 
1931, then it must have had a lengthy pre-embryonic stage. Already, in 1924, left-
wing militants had formed the first anti-fascist organisations in order to counter the 
British Fascisti, later known as the British Fascists.
41
 The CP had also called on the 
working class to organise against fascism in 1925 following the kidnapping of Pollitt 
by a group of British Fascists. Then, during the General Strike in 1926 the CP formed 
an anti-fascist Workers‟ Defence Corps – all of this numerous years before Mosley‟s 
New Party was formed.
42
 
 
The Nature of Opposition 
 
How then, did labour movement opposition to the New Party manifest itself? As we 
have seen, what mattered to the Labour Party was unity, loyalty and discipline. These 
concerns determined a response that was calculated to isolate Mosley and his 
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followers, nullify their appeal and shore up core support. On 10 March 1931, taking 
advantage of the fact that Mosley was incapacitated by illness, the Labour Party‟s 
National Executive Committee met and expelled Mosley from the Labour Party for 
his „gross act of disloyalty‟. In a further move, the NEC resolved that membership of 
the New Party was incompatible with membership of the Labour Party. At no point in 
the NEC resolution was Mosley or the New Party condemned for being fascist. 
Discussion followed relating to five constituency parties affected by the Mosley 
secessions, that is to say Smethwick (Oswald Mosley), Stoke (Cynthia Mosley), 
Aston (John Strachey), Dudley (Oliver Baldwin), and West Wolverhampton (W.J. 
Brown). It was decided that large meetings should be held in each of these 
constituencies, all featuring national party speakers.
43
 The West Midlands, clearly the 
region deemed most at risk, received a high-profile visit in April 1931 from the Prime 
Minister himself. Seven hundred and fifty tickets for MacDonald‟s meeting at the 
Town Hall in West Bromwich were sold to the affected constituencies of Aston, 
Dudley, and Smethwick.
44
 Elsewhere in the region, Hebert Morrison, Minister for 
Transport, spoke in neighbouring Dudley, whilst in Stoke, Arthur Greenwood 
implored that „Now that war has been declared‟, the New Party „must be trampled 
underfoot‟.45 No further measures were deemed necessary, not least because the local 
Labour parties in these five constituencies had already repudiated the Mosley MPs. 
They had been joined too by the divisional Labour Party in West Renfrewshire, which 
had dissociated itself from its Mosley MP (Dr Robert Forgan), and recommended 
selection of a new Labour Party parliamentary candidate.
46
  
 Given the geography of the Mosley secessions, reaction in the West Midlands, 
and particularly in Birmingham, would foretell whether the New Party‟s bark would 
be far louder than its bite. Historically, even though it was Britain‟s largest industrial 
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city, the appeal of „cloth-capped Chamberlain-ism‟ had rendered Birmingham Labour 
Party largely anonymous. Mosley had arrived in the mid-1920s with a promise to 
drive the Chamberlains from the city and make Birmingham the heart of the Socialist 
movement in England. Narrowly defeated by Neville Chamberlain in the Ladywood 
seat in 1924, Mosley was returned to Parliament for Smethwick in 1926, and again in 
1929. 1929 marked the high-point of Labour support in the city and Birmingham 
brought the best set of results for Labour across the entire country.
47
 
Mosley had played (or at least was widely seen to have played) a central part 
in occasioning this success. For Skidelsky, he had taken „an impoverished, sluggish 
party by the scruff of the neck, infused it with his own dynamism (and money) and 
used it to break the hold of the Chamberlain dynasty‟.48 Admittedly, there was some 
lingering resentment amongst local activists, since as the CP‟s Rajani Palme Dutt put 
it, „On the basis of his great wealth and influential connections‟, Mosley had 
„advanced with an extreme rapidity unattainable to ordinary working-class members 
of the Labour Party‟.49 Nonetheless, having drawn from his own funds to provide 
financial support for campaigns, as well as for the city‟s struggling Labour weekly - 
the Birmingham Town Crier – Mosley was much-admired amongst the Borough‟s 
Labour Party. Significantly, Mosley also obtained the services of several key local 
Labour Party figures. Allan Young, former political organiser for the Birmingham 
Borough Labour Party, was made general secretary of the New Party, and from the 
city‟s Aston district came Labour MP John Strachey, and Strachey‟s local agent, Dan 
Davis. If anywhere offered the possibility of a working-class turn to the New Party, it 
was Birmingham. 
 Yet the city‟s Labour Party did not yield - it made sure that when the New 
Party came into existence it did so without grassroots support.
50
 From the very start, 
 13 
the Town Crier poured scorn on Mosley and the New Party. Mosley was portrayed as 
an arrogant, reckless adventurer who had never understood the character of the 
Labour Party, „in it but never of it‟, in Hugh Dalton‟s words.51 Questions were raised 
about where the New Party was getting its money from with rumours circulating that 
it was funded by the car manufacturer Sir William Morris in a bid to destroy Labour.
52
 
That the Unionist MP for West Belfast had joined the New Party was also publicised. 
Furthermore, there were allegations that the New Party had attempted to buy Labour 
Party organisers in Birmingham with offers of paid employment.
53
 As the president of 
Birmingham Labour Party, J. Johnson was to write, these underhand tactics were 
„beneath contempt‟ and had made his „blood boil‟.54 With the Town Crier displaying 
its open opposition, the New Party fell on stony ground. The fact that Mosley was laid 
up with illness certainly helped Labour‟s cause. Had Mosley visited Birmingham, he 
might have been able to use his personal appeal to win over some of the rank-and-file. 
That said, the idea that he could have persuaded large numbers of Labourites to cast 
off their party allegiance was more a case of wishful thinking. Labour supporters had 
given a hostile reception to a New Party meeting held at the Astoria in Birmingham in 
March 1931, with both Cynthia Mosley and John Strachey heckled.
55
 The same was 
true for a public meeting held in Aston Park in May 1931 where Strachey was 
subjected to taunts of „traitor‟.56 As MacDonald had told his 1,500–strong audience at 
West Bromwich Town Hall, „I was under the impression that this was what is called a 
“disturbed area.” The only disturbance I have found is your wild demonstration of 
absolute loyalty to Socialism and the Labour Party‟.57 The mistake the organisers of 
the New Party had made, as Johnson saw it, was „to think that Mosley‟s personal 
popularity here in the past would take us with him anywhere he might like to go in the 
future‟.58  
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The most concrete example of Labour‟s open hostility to the New Party 
occurred not in the West Midlands, but in the distressed Lancashire cotton town of 
Ashton-under-Lyne. A parliamentary by-election in April 1931 occasioned the most 
dramatic expression of Labour‟s antipathy. Mosley was the New Party candidate in all 
but name, and after the declaration, while on the town hall steps, he was confronted 
by hundreds of furious Labour supporters. Their rage had been ignited by the belief 
that the New Party‟s intervention had defeated the Labour candidate and secured 
election for the Conservative. According to John Strachey, when faced with the 
violent hostility of the crowd at Ashton, Mosley turned against the working class and 
„At that moment British Fascism was born.‟59  
„Judas‟ and „traitor‟ were the cries directed at Mosley, who had been warned 
by a senior Labour Party agent not to venture outside Ashton town hall otherwise he 
would be lynched by the crowd, 
 
For several minutes he stood there, his hat in his hand, held up in an effort to 
obtain a hearing. But it was useless. The crowd, waving their hands, moved 
forward and a cordon of police was at once thrown across the bottom of the 
steps... It was a dramatic moment. Just for a second it seemed touch and go as 
to whether Sir Oswald and his friends would or would not be actually 
attacked.
60
 
 
In the event, as Mosley recalled, „I went through the crowd with a few companions 
and we suffered no serious injury.‟61 Seeing as meetings addressed by Mosley in the 
week before polling day had passed off without incident (the Ashton Herald had 
reported „scenes of remarkable enthusiasm‟ for Mosley and the New Party candidate 
 15 
at an election meeting attended by nearly 6,000 at the Armoury),
62
 it had evidently 
been the result that had incited the opposition, not the New Party‟s campaign itself.63  
The events at Ashton confirm that Labour‟s anger was driven first and 
foremost by feelings of betrayal, and not anti-fascism. Ashton also allowed Labour 
supporters „to work off the frustration engendered by the shortcomings of the 
MacDonald government‟, as Colin Cross has previously noted.64 But to propose that 
Ashton somehow pushed Mosley to fascism is surely too simplistic. It was early 1932 
before Mosley committed to the fascist cause, and as Matthew Worley has 
convincingly argued, „Such a journey was not inevitable; alternative paths were taken 
by New Party members, and were considered by Mosley throughout.‟65 In any case, 
Labour‟s antipathy soon cooled. The reasons why are clear enough. As a political 
force, what Ashton had demonstrated was that the New Party was not worth worrying 
about. If it could not break through in Ashton – a town with 46.2 per cent 
unemployment - it would not break through anywhere. The Birmingham Town Crier 
estimated that it would take the New Party a quarter of a century to put itself on the 
political map.
66
 Secondly, although the Mosley manifesto had originally been signed 
by 17 MPs,
67
 the New Party‟s effective strength in parliament had never exceeded 
more than six, and it had further dwindled to just four by the time Strachey departed 
in July 1931.
68
 Arthur Greenwood had demanded to know: „Where are the thirty of 
forty dissatisfied members of the Labour party whom he thought he was going to 
carry with him? They have vanished like smoke, and he is left with a little skeleton 
crew‟.69 Indeed, of the remaining four rebel MPs, „W.E.D. Allen was always a writer 
rather than a speaker, and Dr. Forgan was distinguished more for his agreeable 
manners and pleasing personality that for platform performance‟, as Mosley later 
conceded.
70
 To all intents and purposes, Oswald and Cynthia Mosley now made up 
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the body of the New Party membership in the House of Commons. Moreover, since 
February, the New Party had largely absented itself from the House, and in so doing 
marginalised itself, arguing that attendance was futile given the dearth of specific 
policies to deal with unemployment. Thirdly, outside the House, fearing a split in the 
Labour movement, the miners had soon dropped their support for Mosley once the 
New Party was formed. Arthur Cook never made any public declaration of support for 
the New Party, and besides, following a leg amputation in January 1931 and further 
debilitated by illness, he was no longer a factor. Cook had limited influence in the 
TUC and it kept its distance. Although sympathetic to the Mosley Memorandum, 
Ernest Bevin on the TUC General Council helped steer it on a moderate course. 
Finally, when the New Party re-entered the political fray in the autumn of 1931, the 
Labour Party‟s major preoccupation now lay with other „traitors‟, not least Ramsay 
MacDonald. 
Even though the Communist Party had participated in early shows of 
opposition, it was not until September-October 1931, when the CP took the lead, that 
hostility to the New Party turned more violent.  By this time, the New Party had 
exposed „proto-fascism‟ at its core, thereby validating the CP line that Mosley‟s New 
Party was evolving from the womb of „social fascism‟ to „open fascism‟. In May 
1931, Mosley had decided on establishing a body of young men who could give 
„physical support‟ to the New Party programme and protect its meetings. His promise 
that the „only methods we shall employ will be English methods. We shall rely on the 
good old English fist‟ did little to cancel out the inevitable comparisons with 
continental fascist movements.
71
 „Nor were suspicions eased‟, as Skidelsky points out, 
„when two New Party officials left for Munich apparently to study Hitler‟s 
methods‟.72 This was soon followed with proposals for a series of extra-parliamentary 
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youth groups (NUPA), through which Mosley intended to counter the communist 
threat in the event of a revolutionary crisis. Such developments, alongside the New 
Party‟s developing fascination with the idea of a corporate state, led both Strachey73 
and Young to resign from the New Party alleging that Mosley was leading it „in a 
Conservative or Fascist direction‟.74  
At Glasgow Green in September, Mosley was howled down, chased across a 
field and subjected to a barrage of sticks and stones. Three members of his bodyguard 
were slashed with razors.
75
 On 2 October, the New Party‟s Sellick Davis, a former 
Liberal candidate for Evesham, was knocked unconscious following an assault from 
behind by an opponent at a meeting in Glasgow.
76
 On 18 October, at Birmingham‟s 
Rag Market, a section in the 15,000 crowd wielding chairs and chair legs charged the 
platform. Bottles were hurled and a free fight ensued. Three men, including the North-
East London regional secretary of the New Party, received hospital treatment.
77
 The 
next evening at Glasgow‟s St Andrew‟s Hall, the entrances were stormed and there 
was a stampede. Outside, a section of the assembled crowd threatened to throw 
Mosley into the Clyde.
78
 Elsewhere, Sellick Davis, the New Party candidate in 
Merthyr saw his election campaign „punctuated by stones, bottles and “The Red 
Flag”‟.79  
Yet for all the hardening of this opposition, when Mosley or other New Party 
candidates appeared on the platform, their appearance did not always trigger violent 
disturbances.
80
 Rather than anti-fascists, it was the weather that intervened when 
Mosley had opened the New Party‟s autumn campaign at Trafalgar Square on 12 
September 1931. Flanked by two dripping lions, he was forced to address a sea of 
umbrellas. When Mosley had held a meeting in Birmingham on 25 September, Action 
reported that he had received a „splendid reception‟ - only at an overflow meeting of 
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7,000 in Chamberlain Square did Communists „yell‟.81 During the general election 
campaign itself, orderly election meetings were held by Mosley both at Reading and 
at Stoke. His first campaign meeting in Stoke saw 2,000 people inside the hall, and a 
further 1,500 outside listening to his speech through loudspeakers. Mosley‟s speech 
was made with no interruptions whatsoever.
82
 A further „tightly-packed‟ meeting was 
subject to some interruption, but this did not stop Mosley from making a large number 
of points.
83
 On one day in Stoke, Mosley spoke at no fewer than eight outdoor 
meetings.
84
 In Manchester, although subject to much interruption from left-wing 
militants, New Party candidate Sir John Pratt, a former Liberal MP and Under-
Secretary of Health for Scotland, was able to hold ten meetings in eleven days.
85
 At 
one well-attended meeting, he had been given „an attentive hearing‟.86 Meanwhile, in 
Scotland, Robert Forgan had apparently been „well-received‟ at his campaign 
meetings in West Renfrewshire.
87
  
What all of this should warn against is overplaying, as Mosley‟s 
autobiography does, the extent to which the New Party was subject to violent 
opposition. It is simply not true that violence followed Mosley wherever and 
whenever he spoke. This also raises questions about the extent to which CP 
opposition was systematic. If truth be told, the New Party never dominated the CP‟s 
concerns in 1931. Indeed by September-October, the issue of mass working-class 
agitation was of far greater importance. By the end of the year, there had been 
disturbances between the police and unemployed across more than 30 towns and 
cities. In this context, it is hardly surprising that the question of how to advance the 
CP to mass revolutionary leadership on the basis of economic demands would assume 
far more significance than exposing the fascist potential of the New Party. With just 
2,700 members in June 1931, and little more than 6,200 by November, the CP‟s 
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central concern was to overcome its own weakness and isolation so that it could take 
maximum advantage of what it understood as an ongoing process of mass 
radicalisation.
88
 After all, the recent influx of members - membership of the CP was 
up to 9,000 by January 1932
89
 - had not been occasioned by anti-fascist campaigns 
but by the collapse of the Labour Government. 
 
Setting a Pattern? 
 
Did opposition to Mosley‟s New Party set a pattern for fascist and anti-fascist 
confrontation after 1932? The similarities are obvious. „From the first‟, writes 
Skidelsky, „there emerged a pattern which hardly varied throughout the 1930s: vast 
audiences of the curious come to hear the prophet, groups of angry Labour militants 
and communists determined to prevent him from being heard‟.90 Yet heckling and 
rowdy behaviour were hardly new to political meetings and so to suggest that a 
distinctive pattern of behaviour was first established in 1931 is somewhat crude. As 
Jon Lawrence has pointed out, pre-war traditions of disruption at political meetings 
were sustained into the interwar period, especially in major cities, such as London, 
Glasgow and Birmingham.
91
 Taking a broader view still, the meetings of other 
national politicians were also subject to disruption during the 1931 election campaign. 
At one election meeting in Liverpool, convened in support of a National Labour 
candidate, the former Labour Employment Minister, J. H. Thomas, was howled down 
three times by „Everton Rowdies‟ who subjected him to cries of „traitor‟.92 As the 
Birmingham Gazette reflected, „Lively meetings, with brisk heckling, are part of the 
game. Candidates expect them and – if they are up to their job – enjoy them‟.93 What 
seemed different about the New Party‟s meetings in Birmingham and Glasgow, 
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however, was the violence, aggravated further by Mosley‟s use of a personal 
bodyguard which underscored his determination not to be silenced or intimidated. It 
was this violence that was carried through into later campaigns against the BUF.  And 
yet, too much can be made of such violence. After the events at Olympia, the CP 
made attempts to curtail physical confrontation at large BUF meetings. The CP 
wanted to break Labour Party rhetoric, which had identified left-wing militancy with 
the type of disorder that had led to the rise of fascism on the continent.
94
  
For its part, Labour‟s policy towards the BUF developed from its 1931 reading 
of Mosley as a potential dictator. For Labour, anti-fascism meant opposition to 
dictatorship. And since it also identified Communism with dictatorship, Labour 
refused to co-operate with the CP in anti-fascist campaigns. Once again, it looked to 
expose Mosley as an aristocratic enemy of the working class.
95
 More accommodating 
was the ILP. Following its disaffiliation from the Labour Party in 1932, it undertook 
joint anti-fascist action with the CP which had, in light of the Nazi seizure of power, 
called for a „united front‟ against fascism.  
Opposition to the BUF also had a much broader base. It need hardly be added 
that as a consequence of the prominence that the BUF afforded to anti-Semitism, the 
Jewish community became involved in anti-BUF campaigns. But for the moment at 
least, Mosleyites did not give the Anglo-Jewish community much cause for concern. 
In fact, the New Party had recruited a number of Jews, including Edward „Kid‟ Lewis, 
former welterweight boxing champion and head of the New Party‟s stewarding 
section. Furthermore, contemporary accounts, such as Cecil Melville‟s The Truth 
About the New Party (1931) stressed that Mosley‟s New Party was „not addicted to 
any race-conscious feeling. It is not Anti-Semitic‟. Melville was confident that „We 
shall not witness in London the spectacle of cohorts of young Mosleyites heaving 
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half-bricks through the plate-glass windows, of, say, Messrs. Salmon and 
Gluckstein‟.96 Yet it is now quite clear that the New Party harboured anti-Semites. In 
the summer of 1932 there were reports of a speaker from Mosley‟s „New Movement‟ 
having opened a meeting with „Down with the Jews‟.97 There was also a case of a 
Mosleyite being arrested for plastering anti-Jewish posters on a drapery shop in 
London‟s Oxford Street.98 As one activist was to write in the New Party‟s internal 
newsletter,  
 
A tiny movement such as ours simply cannot afford in its early stages, openly 
to abuse the Jew, or to make anti-Semitism its main plank... Let us wait until 
we have developed, until we have grown and become a power in Britain: then 
we can translate our hatred of the despicable parasites – who seek to profit in 
our downfall – from futile words to deeds!99 
 
Conclusion 
 
On final reflection, in contrast to labour movement opposition to the BUF, which was 
driven by anti-fascism, we can disaggregate opposition to the New Party. In other 
words, it was not simply a case of „incipient anti-fascism‟ or a defence against 
„Mosleyitis‟ – the opposition to Mosley contained elements of both. First of all, we 
had the Labour Party‟s response which, as we have seen, defined itself in terms of 
resistance to upper-class treachery or „Mosleyitis‟. Then there was the Communist 
Party‟s „incipient anti-fascism‟, which started out as opposition to „social fascism‟, 
before moving on to attack the New Party‟s „fascism in embryo‟. This is not to say 
that Labour hecklers did not cry „fascism‟ or that Communist hecklers did not accuse 
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Mosley of treachery. Whilst disaggregation was reproduced at the grassroots, it was 
not rigidly so, especially when the Communist Party was so keen to exploit the 
resentment felt by Labour supporters at Mosley‟s „betrayal‟.100   
When re-aggregated as a whole, this opposition was certainly not without 
effect. By frustrating the New Party‟s attempts to build support in working-class 
constituencies in the Midlands, North and Scotland, labour movement opposition was 
an obvious factor in its failure. But this was just one reason amongst several others. 
Organisational deficiencies and the fact that the New Party was ignored by the press 
also readily spring to mind. In the end, Mosley‟s New Party was simply overtaken and 
overwhelmed by political events. During October 1931, crowded out by the „national‟ 
appeal of the MacDonald-Baldwin coalition, and Labour‟s radical turn, Mosley had 
the electoral ground cut from under his feet. Left without a platform on which to 
stand, the New Party was obliterated at the polls.
101
 The orange marigolds that its 
candidates wore in their button holes now well and truly discarded in the waste bin of 
British political history. 
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